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I. INTRODUCTION
Even before the death of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and the retirement
of Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, election law scholars had declared that
the Supreme Court had reached "doctrinal interregnum."' "[L]ost in the political
thicket, ' 2 the factions on the Court had begun going through the motions like a pair
of punch-drunk fighters.3 In the campaign finance arena, the Court's jurisprudence
was becoming increasingly incoherent.4 Some scholars lamented that the Court
appeared to have "thrown in the towel ' 5 in the mammoth McConnell v. FEC6 case,
but others defended the incoherence on the postmodern grounds that the Court does
not take its doctrine seriously, so we shouldn't either.7
* William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks
to Grant Hayden for useful comments and to Regan Parker for research assistance.
1. Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal
Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503,517 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 516.
4. Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 32-33 (2004).
5. Samuel Issacharoff, Throwing in the Towel: The Constitutional Morass of Campaign Finance,
3 ELECTION L.J. 259, 264 (2004).
6. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Empirics of Campaign Finance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 944-45
(2005). ("I do not disagree with Hasen that the Court's opinions in these cases have downplayed
empirical evidence. They have. The Court often does not carefully consider evidence bearing directly
on those issues that existing doctrine makes relevant. I disagree with Hasen, however, about the import
of that observation. Are the Justices using evidence merely to shore up, where possible, their 'simple
value judgments ... on the wisdom of particular campaign finance laws'? If so, Hasen is right to
1
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Campaign finance law is no aberration. Voting rights scholars have questioned
whether voting rights law is at war with itself,8 and debated whether the Supreme
Court furthered or hindered minority voting rights in Georgia v. Ashcroft,9 its most
recent decision interpreting Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act." That scholars
need to ask such a fundamental question shows the level of difficulty with the
Court's doctrine.
In the area of partisan gerrymandering, the Court issued a "'monumental non-
decision""' in Vieth v. Jubelirer,2 splitting 4-1-4.13 Justice Kennedy-who
provided the swing vote-refused to take a position on when partisan gerrymanders
violate the Constitution. 14 Later the same Termn, the Court summarily affirmed a
lower court decision on the one-person, one-vote rule. 5 In doing so, the Court
simultaneously upset existing precedent regarding permissible deviations from
strict mathematical equality in redistricting, and implicitly suggested-contrary to
Vieth-that naked partisan interest can be a reason for policing gerrymanders that
violate the one-person, one-vote rule. 16
criticize them. There is another possibility, however, that Hasen does not discuss. The Court may treat
evidence somewhat cursorily in its opinions, not because it is proceeding on its instincts or working out
the Justices' individual views of what the political system should look like, but because it has lost faith
in the kinds of questions the existing doctrinal apparatus makes relevant. If the Court believes that
existing doctrine is asking the wrong questions and therefore making the wrong evidence relevant, and
the Court feels unable, for whatever reason, to revise constitutional doctrine to better conform it to what
constitutional principle requires, we should expect the opinions to offer unsatisfying evidentiary and
doctrinal analyses except in those odd instances in which existing doctrine and the Court's actual view
of constitutional principle point in the same direction." (quoting Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the
Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL.
L. REV. 885, 917 (2005)).
8. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself?. Social Science and
Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV 1517, 1523 (2002).
9. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
10. Compare Gerken, supra note 1, at 531-40 (positing that Georgia v. Ashcroft is likely to
improve application of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act), and Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 28, 89-101 (2004) (same), with
Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 36
(2004) (concluding Georgia v. Ashcroft is harmful to the minority interests Section 5 protects).
11. Charles Lane, Justices Order New Look at Tex. Redistricting Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 19,
2004, at A21 (quoting this author's characterization of Vieth); see also Richard L. Hasen, Looking for
Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J.
626, 627-28 (2004) (characterizing Vieth as "a disappointment" and arguing "the Court should remain
content staying out of the business of policing partisan gerrymandering until a societal near-consensus
emerges regarding the permissible range of using voters' party affiliation in redistricting").
12. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
13. See id. at 271, 306, 317, 343, 355.
14. See id. at 306-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (summary affirmance).
16. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 567-68 (2004) ("Thus, while Vieth essentially cuts
off first-order political gerrymandering claims-that is, plaintiffs cannot get a plan struck down simply
by showing that it constitutes an excessively partisan gerrymander-Cox v. Larios restores an
opportunity for second-order judicial review of political gerrymanders: if a plan contains any population
deviations, a court may decide that the deviations are caused by impermissible partisanship and strike
[Vol. 57:669
2
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Meanwhile, the Court has not yet explained the scope of its equal protection
ruling in Bush v. Gore.7 As predicted," courts and scholars have divided on both
the precedential value of the decision and, assuming the decision has precedential
value, the precise reach of its holding. The country dodged a bullet when the
margin in the 2004 election was not razor-thin, but litigation regarding these "nuts
and bolts"' 9 election issues is increasing without any guidance yet from the
Supreme Court on constitutional limits.
20
While it is hard to know for sure, the doctrinal incoherence and uncertainty of
the Supreme Court's recent election law decisions could well be the product of the
same group of nine Justices deciding too many of these cases together over a
number of years: Positions may have hardened, new ideas may be scarce, and the
ability to convince a colleague to change a position may be slight. The Justices
seemed much like the protagonists in Jean-Paul Sartre's play, No Exit, who found
that Hell was being kept in a room with the same people for all eternity.21
With the change of two Justices on the Supreme Court, exit from doctrinal
incoherence and uncertainty becomes possible. The replacement of Chief Justice
Rehnquist with new Chief Justice John Roberts2 2 and the replacement of Justice
O'Connor with Justice Samuel Alito23 could provide an opening for major changes
in Supreme Court election law doctrine. This is especially true with Justice
O'Connor's departure because she held the swing vote in key election law cases.
What sort of changes should we expect from the Roberts Court? Making
predictions is exceedingly difficult when those who have not expressed (or not
recently expressed) views on these subjects likely will hold the swing votes, and
those who are concerned with respecting (even wrong-headed) precedent could
prove a strong force. Additionally, the Justices' views certainly may change over
time. Still, I work under the assumption that a conservative President, who
apparently committed himself to appointing justices in the mold of Justices Thomas
the plan down as a formal matter for failure to comply with one-person, one-vote. But in order to hold
that a deviation is unjustified, courts must necessarily develop some idea of where the line between
constitutionally legitimate and constitutionally illegitimate partisanship falls. In short, they must do
exactly what four of the Justices who rejected the plaintiffs' claims in Vieth ... thought could not be
done." (citations omitted)).
17. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
18. See Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of "Judicially Unmanageable" Standards in Election
Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1497 (2002) (discussions the opacity
of the opinion and predicting that the Court will eventually sort out the various lower courts'
interpretations).
19. Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Laws in Elections, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 377 (2001).
20. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937,956-57 (2005).
21. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, No Exrr AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 47 (L. Abel trans., Vintage Books
Ed. 1955) ("There's no need for red hot pokers. Hell is-other people!").
22. Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST,
Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
23. David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn in as Justice After Senate Gives Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2006, at A21.
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and Scalia,24 is unlikely to appoint Justices who in fact move the Court to the left.
Instead, these new Justices could well move the Court to the right in key election
law cases.
The result is that five to ten years from now, the ground rules for American
political competition could undergo a major change. Within the next decade, we
could see deregulation of campaign financing and a limitation of congressional
power to impose national solutions to minority voting rights problems. We could
also see the Court upholding state power to both redistrict for partisan gain and
impose increasingly draconian election administration tools in the name of fraud
prevention.
In recent years, some election law scholars have suggested that the Court exit
from particular comers of the political thicket by relaxing its one-person, one-vote
rules to allow for greater representation of minority rights or by abandoning its
more conservative racial gerrymandering jurisprudence.2 But if the Court makes
a selective exit from the political thicket, it likely will not be in these areas. Rather,
we can expect the Court to act in ways that undercut the power of the government
to foster political equality through campaign finance and increase state power to
regulate the electoral process in increasingly partisan ways.
However, wholesale exit from the political thicket appears unlikely. Since
2000, the Court has continued its trend of deciding major election law cases, though
perhaps at a slower rate than in previous years.26 But, the election law cases it has
24. On the controversy over Bush's statements in this regard, see Media Matters for America, Did
Bush Promise to Appoint a Justice like Scalia? CNN's Bash Busted an "Urban Myth" with a Myth of
Her Own, While Fred Barnes Changed His Story-Then Changed It Back Again, Oct. 13, 2005,
http://mediamatters.org/items/200510130005.
25. Grant M. Hayden, The Supreme Court and Voting Rights: A More Complete Exit Strategy, 83
N.C. L. REV. 949, 961 (2005) (arguing the Supreme Court should relax its one-person, one-vote
standards); Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the Least
Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 694 (2002) (arguing the Supreme
Court should end policing of racial gerrymandering). When I say the racial gerrymandering
jurisprudence is "conservative," I mean only that it is supported by the more conservative Justices on
the Court. For an argument that conservatives should dislike those cases, see Daniel Hays Lowenstein,
You Don't Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998).
26. From January 2001 through the end of January 2006, the Supreme Court decided twelve
election law cases with a written opinion. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006);
Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146
(2003); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765
(2002); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431 (2001); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). The Court
also granted certiorari in a campaign financing case, Randell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2005) (No. 04-1528), and agreed to hear a challenge to mid-
cycle redistricting in Texas, League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Tex.
2005), prob. juris. noted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2005) (No. 05-204). At this pace, it is
doubtful the Court will reach the average of sixty election law cases it has decided each decade since
the 1960s. See RICHARD L. HASEN. THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 1-3 (2003).
4
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decided since 2000 have been major ones, including one accompanied by the
longest set of opinions in Supreme Court history.27
The remainder of this Article sets forth my speculation about the future of
election law in the Roberts Court in four key areas: campaign finance, voting rights,
partisan gerrymandering, and "nuts -and-bolts" election administration issues.
II. CAMPAIGN FINANCE: THE END OF THE NEW DEFERENCE?
Since the Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Valeo2 in 1976, its campaign
finance jurisprudence has swung like a pendulum. In Buckley-a compromise
decision drafted by committee 29-the Supreme Court upheld new federal limits on
contributions to candidates, but struck down limits on independent spending and
spending by candidates.30 Although the Buckley Court decided many constitutional
claims challenging the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, the
contribution and expenditure limit holdings have proven to be the most important.
The Court held that contribution limits did not run afoul of the First Amendment
rights of freedom of speech and association because they entailed only a "marginal"
restriction on free speech3' and the government's interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption justified the limits.32 These interests, in contrast,
could not justify the independent spending (and candidate spending) limits33
because the limits threatened to restrict more directly core political speech protected
by the First Amendment and presented a more attenuated risk of quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance.34 The Court also rejected political equality as
justification for spending limits.35
In the years after Buckley, the Court initially showed much hostility toward
campaign finance regulation,36 striking down laws limiting contributions 37 and
expenditures in ballot measure campaigns.38 The Court also struck down a law
27. "The opinions [in McConnell v. FEC] had the largest U.S. Reports page count (279, excluding
the heading and syllabus) and second largest word count (89,694) in Supreme Court history." DANIEL
HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 892 (3d ed. 2004).
28. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
29. Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History ofBuckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION L.J. 241,245
(2003).
30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143. The Court also upheld a fairly comprehensive set of disclosure rules.
Id. at 84; see Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251 (2004).
31. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20.
32. Id. at 26.
33. Id. at 45.
34. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-48 (1976).
35. Id. at 48-49 ("[T~he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .....
36. For a more detailed history, see Hasen, supra note 4, at 39-41.
37. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
38. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981).
2006]
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limiting independent spending that was part of the system for the partial public
financing of presidential campaigns.39
Since 2000, however, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has shifted toward
much greater deference to legislative determinations of proper campaign finance
limitations. Elsewhere I analyze in detail the four cases making up what I have
termed the "New Deference Quartet."' ° The most significant of these cases is the
2000 case, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.4 1 In upholding the
constitutionality of Missouri's campaign contribution limits for state offices, the
Shrink Missouri Court made four important changes to its campaign finance
jurisprudence.42 First, the Court ratcheted down the level of scrutiny for reviewing
contribution limits from Buckley's "exacting" level of scrutiny43 to one in which
interests need only be "'sufficiently important' 4 and "'closely drawn,"' 45 and not
narrowly tailored to the government's interest.46
Second, the Court expanded the definitions of "corruption" and "the
appearance of corruption" that serve to justify the government's interest in
campaign finance regulations. The Court explained that corruption extended
beyond arrangements to embrace "the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors."47 As for the appearance of corruption, the
Court remarked, "Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical
assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters
to take part in democratic governance. "48
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Court lowered the evidentiary burden
for proving corruption or the appearance of corruption. The Court began by noting
the "quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny
of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of
the justification raised. ' 49 Although the Court insisted that "mere conjecture" s of
potential corruption was not enough to support a campaign contribution limit, it
held that Missouri could justify the need for its contribution limits to fight
corruption or the appearance of corruption with some pretty flimsy evidence.5 The
evidence included an affidavit from a Missouri legislator who supported the
39. FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985).
40. See Hasen, supra note 4, at 68; Hasen, supra note 7, at 886.
41. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
42. Id. at 397-98. I provide greater details on these claims in Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri,
Campaign Finance, and "The Thing that Wouldn't Leave," 17 CONST. COMMENT. 483,490-97 (2000).
43. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976).
44. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 388 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
45. Id. at 387 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
46. Id. ("[T]he dollar amount of the limit need not be 'fine tun[ed]."' (citing Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 30)).
47. Id. at 389.
48. Id. at 390.
49. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
50. Id. at 392.
51. Id. at 398-95.
[Vol. 57: 669
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legislation stating that "large contributions have 'the real potential to buy votes"' ;52
newspaper accounts suggesting possible corruption in Missouri politics;53 and the
passage of an earlier Missouri voter initiative establishing campaign contribution
limits.
5 4
Fourth, the Court created a high bar for challenging the constitutionality of a
contribution limit as too low to prevent effective advocacy.55 Refining (or
changing) the effective advocacy test from Buckley, the Court's new test asks
"whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to render political
association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of
notice, and render contributions pointless. 5 6 In an era of faxes, web pages, and e-
mails, it is hard to imagine any contribution limit that would fail this test of
constitutionality.
The Court's deference continued in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee (Colorado Jj),57 FEC v. Beaumont," and McConnell v.
FEC.5 9 In McConnell, the Court was very casual in the evidence it required to
uphold both the "soft money" and "issue advocacy" provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (commonly known as the McCain-Feingold law).
Thus, the Court upheld a limit on soft money raising and spending by local political
parties and candidates despite the lack of evidence that these entities and people
were or could be used as conduits for the sale of access to federal elections
officials.60 Similarly, the Court upheld the law's provisions redefining the line
between regulated election advertising and unregulated issue advertising without
a serious examination of the extent to which the law's provisions were
unconstitutionally overbroad in regulating protected speech.6'
Moreover, the McConnell Court reaffirmed and strengthened its 1990 holding
in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.62 At issue in Austin was a
Michigan law that barred corporations, other than media corporations, from using
general treasury funds for independent expenditures in state election campaigns.63
Under Buckley, the Court should have struck down the law regulating independent
expenditures, at least absent proof that corporate independent expenditures in fact
allowed for corruption of candidates. Instead, the Court upheld the law under a
52. Id. at 393 (quoting Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (1998)).
53. Id. (citing Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 738 n.6).
54. Id. at 394.
55. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000).
56. Id.
57. 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (holding by a 5-4 vote that party spending coordinated with the parties'
candidates could constitutionally be treated like a contribution to the candidate with the amounts limited
by the government).
58. 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (upholding a ban on contributions from corporate treasuries by
corporations organized solely for ideological purposes).
59. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
60. See Hasen, supra note 4, at 46-52.
61. Id. at 52-56.
62. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
63. Id. at 654.
2006]
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tortured definition of corruption that looked much more like an equality rationale
for regulation. 64
Austin was considered a questionable precedent for many years,65 in part
because it stood in tension with Buckley and other post-Buckley cases. McConnell
not only reaffirmed Austin's application to corporations engaged in election-related
activity, McConnell-without discussion-upheld Austin's application to labor
union spending as well.66
The New Deference cases exhibited increasing incoherence when measured
against the Buckley standard. The Court continued to use the rhetoric of Buckley's
anticorruption rationale, but the reasoning was increasingly strained. With three of
the Justices in the majority in these cases explicitly endorsing an equality or
"participatory self-government" rationale for campaign financing limits, 67 and a
fourth leading the New Deference revolution by writing most of the majority
opinions,6 ' apparently the need to keep Justice O'Connor's crucial fifth vote drove
the disconnect between the Court's rhetoric showing fidelity to Buckley and the
reality of New Deference. Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens jointly authored
the primary majority opinion in McConnell, which is as doctrinally wooden as a
campaign finance opinion can be written. But the trend toward recognizing
political equality in these cases led some commentators to predict the Court could
move toward upholding spending limits in candidate elections and upholding
contribution and spending limits in ballot measure elections.69
Those predictions, however, depended upon the continued stability of the
Rehnquist Court. With the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist and the retirement of
Justice O'Connor, the pendulum appears poised to swing back toward deregulation.
Four Justices-Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens-remain committed to the
New Deference. On the other hand, Justice Thomas and, more recently, Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, have attacked Buckley from the other end. They argue that
contribution limits-like spending limits-should be subject to strict scrutiny and
therefore often, if not always, be an unconstitutional infringement on the First
Amendment like spending limits. They have also rejected the permissibility of
expenditure limits Austin applied to corporations, which McConnell reaffirmed and
64. Id. at 659-60 ("Regardless of whether [the] danger of 'financial quidpro quo' corruption may
be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a
different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." (citations omitted)).
65. See Hasen, supra note 4, at 42.
66. See id. at 57.
67. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("I believe the Government has an important interest in leveling the electoral playing field
by constraining the cost of federal campaigns."); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
400-04 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (setting forth his view of the participatory self government
rationale for campaign finance regulation).
68. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinions in Shrink Missouri, Colorado I1, and Beaumont.
69. See Hasen, supra note 4, at 67-72; Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the
Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147 (2004).
[Vol. 57: 669
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extended to unions.7 ° Indeed, these Justices, joined by the late Chief Justice,
dissented from major portions of the McConnell decision as well as in the three
other New Deference cases.
While it is impossible to know how Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will
vote in future campaign finance cases, further expansion of the New Deference
seems the least likely possibility. In one of the questionnaires he filled out for the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that he had worked for the
Reagan and Bush Administrations because he generally agreed with the
Administrations' policies. 7' Reagan and Bush supporters appear to side more with
Justice Thomas on campaign finance questions than the Justices of the New
Deference.72 It therefore seems most probable that at least Chief Justice Roberts
will fall on the Thomas side.
We will have an early test of the new Justices' views on the New Deference
when the Court considers the constitutionality of Vermont's campaign finance law,
which includes candidate spending limits, in the 2006 Term.73 While Buckley did
not categorically exclude the possibility of the Court upholding spending limits, it
rejected many arguments that might justify spending limits. Campaign finance
specialists would consider it an expansion of the power of the government for the
Court to uphold candidate spending limits, while a contrary decision could simply
be a reaffirmation of the Buckley status quo.
Thus, it seems unlikely the Roberts Court will continue the New Deference
expansion. Rather, the most salient issue is whether the two new Justices will stick
with the status quo, perhaps in the name of judicial modesty and stare decisis,74 or
70. Briffault, supra note 69, at 149 ("Moreover, not only did Justices Scalia and Thomas reiterate
their prior rejection of Buckley's validation of contribution restrictions, but Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, sharply criticized as '[ulnworkable and ill advised' the portion of Buckley
subjecting contribution restrictions to less than strict scrutiny. Thus, McConnell is as precarious a
victory for reform as it is sweeping. Both the specific holdings and the Court's basic approach to
campaign finance restriction could be dramatically transformed if and when the membership of the
Court changes." (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 311 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring and
dissenting)).
71. Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., Responses of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr. to the Written Questions
of Senator Dianne Feinstein Submitted on Behalf of Senator Barbara Mikulski 5, available at
http:/legalaffairs.org/howappealing/RobertsAnswers3.pdf ("I was generally sympathetic with the
policies of both administrations.").
72. Indeed, when President Bush signed the McCain-Feingold legislation, he expressed serious
doubt about the constitutionality of some of its major provisions. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note
27, at 892. He may have signed the bill in the belief that the Court would strike most of it down as
unconstitutional, leaving in place more generous individual contribution limits that could benefit his
reelection campaign. See Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 Wis. L. REV. (forthcoming).
73. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 126
S. Ct. 35 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2005) (No. 04-1528). For more on this case, see Richard Biffault, A Changing
Supreme Court Considers Major Campaign Finance Questions: Randall v. Sorrell, and Wisconsin
Right to Life v. FEC, 5 ELECTION L.J. 74 (2006).
74. These were major themes sounded in the confirmation hearings of Justice Roberts. See Sheryl
Gay Stolberg & Adam Liptak, Roberts Fields Questions on Privacy and Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 2005, at Al.
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move more aggressively toward the Justice Thomas deregulation model for
campaign financing.
We may soon have an answer to this question. First, the Court in the Vermont
case could distinguish Shrink Missouri and strike down Vermont's low campaign
contribution limits. Second, a more serious challenge to the New Deference should
return before the Court next Term. This Term, before Justice Alito joined the Court,
it surprisingly disposed of the Wisconsin Right to Life campaign finance case
unanimously.75 The Court examined whether a corporation that pays to run a
television advertisement close to an election which is intended to be about issues,
not about electing candidates, is entitled to an exemption from McCain-Feingold' s
prohibition on corporate and union electioneering ads close to an election.76 The
case in all likelihood will return to the Court in the 2007 Term,77 A deregulationist
Court could decide the issue narrowly by ruling that corporations are entitled to an
exemption for "genuine issue ads. ' 78 But it is also possible that a deregulationist
Court could move aggressively, reverse Austin and McConnell, and hold that
corporations and unions, like individuals and other groups, have a right to spend
unlimited sums independently to support or oppose candidates for office, thereby
obviating the need for an exemption.
The one type of campaign finance regulation that does not appear to be in
immediate danger of being overturned is disclosure. Though many open questions
remain about the constitutionality of disclosure, all the current Justices, except
Justice Thomas, reaffirmed in McConnell the government's ability to require
disclosure in reports of contributions and expenditures in candidate campaigns.
79
Ill. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
In the voting rights arena, the Supreme Court has split 5-4 on some major
issues, with Justice O'Connor casting the deciding vote. For example, Justice
O'Connor wrote the decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 80 a case that makes it easier
for jurisdictions covered under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to gain
preclearance when they undertake redistricting. Section 5 prevents jurisdictions
with a history of discrimination from making voting changes without first proving
75. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006); Linda Greenhouse, Court Opens
Campaign Law to Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at A16.
76. Wis. Right to Life, 126 S. Ct. at 1017.
77. The case is now back before the three-judge court.
78. Alternatively, the Court could rule that the particular corporation in question, Wisconsin Right
to Life, is entitled to a special exemption available to certain ideological corporations. Such a ruling
would require an expansion of the Court's earlier holding in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986), granting an exemption to a similar group. For more on this point, see
posting of Marty Lederman, marty.lederman@comcast.net, to election-law_.gl@majordomo.Us.edu
(Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://majordomo.lls.edu/cgi-bin/lwgate/ELECTION-
LAW_GLarchives/election-lawgl.archive.0510/date/article- 107.html.
79. See Hasen, supra note 29.
80. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). For background on the points made in this paragraph, see LOWENSTEIN
& HASEN, supra note 27, at 159-87.
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to the Department of Justice or a three-judge court in Washington, D.C., that the
changes will not have the purpose or effect of "retrogressing" the position of
minorities. Before Ashcroft, most commentators believed the test for retrogression
in redistricting involved a rather mechanical counting of the number of majority-
minority districts and a finding that the number had not decreased. Ashcroft, in
contrast, imposes a less mechanical "totality of the circumstances" test which would
allow some jurisdictions' redistricting plans to be precleared even if the total
number of majority-minority districts decreases, provided minorities had other
opportunities to influence the outcome of the political process.8 For example, it
may no longer be retrogression for a jurisdiction to decrease the number of
majority-minority jurisdictions if new opportunities for minority influence exist.
Such opportunities include the use of "'influence districts"' 82 whereby minority
voters have some influence over who is elected in particular districts, even though
they may lack the voting power to determine that choice out right.
It is not clear that Ashcroft will continue to state the law of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. Congress is expected to renew Section 5 in 2007, and some
commentators have urged83 Congress to write the new Section 5 so as to reverse
Ashcroft and Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board.'
Ashcroft could remain important even if Congress reverses it for Section 5
purposes. Already, lower courts have looked to Ashcroft for guidance on what it
means for jurisdictions to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, an
unexpiring provision that applies nationwide to ensure members of protected
minority groups have the same opportunities to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice. In Thornburg v. Gingles,86 the
Supreme Court set out a three-part threshold test for determining whether the
drawing of legislative districts violates Section 2, followed by a broader totality of
81. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480.
82. Id. at 482.
83. See The Voting Rights Act: Section 5-Preclearance Standards: Oversight Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of
Mark A. Posner, Attorney-at-Law), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/
posner1 10105.pdf (advocating that Congress reverse Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board in renewed
Voting Rights Act); Associated Press, Rights Groups Bid to End 'Influence' Rule, MSNBC.com, Nov.
9, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9983118/ (reporting that the ACLU and NAACP advocate that
Congress reverse Ashcroft in renewed Voting Rights Act).
84. 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (holding with a 5-4 vote that the federal government must grant
preclearance to a redistricting plan in a covered jurisdiction, even if the jurisdiction enacted the plan
with an intent to discriminate against a protected minority group, so long as the jurisdiction had no
intent to make the position of the minority group worse than it had been in the past).
85. See, e.g., Metts v. Murphy, 347 F.3d 346 (1st Cir. 2003) (depublished), available at 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21987, at *18 ("The Supreme Court's recent opinion in [Georgia v. Ashcroft] also supports
our conclusion that crossover districts should be considered in the § 2 context."), vacated on reh 'g, 363
F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004) (en banc); see also Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 431-32 n.13 (4th Cir. 2004)
(rejecting plaintiffs' argument that Ashcroft gives plaintiffs an entitlement to a crossover district under
Section 2).
86. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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the circumstances test.8 7 Justice O'Connor wrote a concurrence in Gingles calling
for a more flexible test, one that looks much more like Ashcroft.8 '
How much Ashcroft will affect the law of Section 2 remains an open question.
For example, courts applying Gingles may hold that a jurisdiction violates Section
2 when it fails to create a majority-minority district in the face of racially polarized
voting and a large, compact, protected-minority voting population. UnderAshcroft,
the state might be able to defend the failure to create such a district on grounds that
the jurisdiction was providing other opportunities to protected minority groups,
such as the creation of minority influence districts.
It is hard to predict precisely how the Roberts Court will interpret the Voting
Rights Act, particularly because we do not know the extent of congressional
tinkering with its provisions at the time of renewal. We do have some clues about
Chief Justice Roberts' thinking, however. In 1982, when Congress amended the
Act to add the current version of Section 2, Chief Justice Roberts was working in
the Reagan White House as the point person opposing the new Section 2. In
documents made public during the confirmation process, then-government attorney
Roberts wrote that the new Section 2 would "establish essentially a quota system"
and "provide a basis for the most intrusive interference imaginable by federal courts
into state and local processes. ' 89 He added that "[i]t would be difficult to conceive
of a more drastic alteration of local governmental affairs."' Imposing the new
Section 2 nationwide, he concluded, would be "not only constitutionally suspect,
but also contrary to the most fundamental [tenets] of the legislative process on
which the laws of this country are based."9'
We do not know whether Chief Justice Roberts has changed his views about
the Voting Rights Act since 1982, and the question of Section 2's wisdom of course
differs from the question of how judges should interpret the statute. However, it
suggests Chief Justice Roberts could well be hostile to expansive readings of the
Voting Rights Act, and amenable to interpretations such as Ashcroft which make
it harder for plaintiffs to bring claims under the Act.92 Presumably that would leave
the deciding votes on the questions in the hands of Justice O'Connor's successor,
Justice Alito, who could provide the fifth vote for a less expansive reading of the
Act.
Justice O'Connor has also been the crucial fifth vote in the racial
gerrymandering cases, beginning with Shaw v. Reno.93  In these racial
87. Id. at 79-80.
88. Id. at 98-100 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. Memorandum from John Roberts to Brad Reynolds 2-3 (December 22, 1981), available at
http://www.ils.edu/academics/faculty/pubs/hasen-roberts-vra- 1 .pdf.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 4.
92. For similar reasons, Chief Justice Roberts could be skeptical of attempts to read Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act to bar state felon-disenfranchisement laws. On this question, see Richard L.
Hasen, The Uncertain Congressional Power to Ban State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 49 HOWARD
L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
93. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For more background on the development of the racial gerrymandering
cause of action, see LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 27, at 245-316.
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gerrymandering cases, the Supreme Court has held that when a jurisdiction
redistricts, it may not take race too much into account in drawing district lines
absent a compelling justification. The doctrine has shifted over time, and its
contours have depended wholly upon Justice O'Connor's views of the cases. In the
most recent of these cases, Easley v. Cromartie,94 Justice O'Connor provided the
crucial fifth vote and, with the four more liberal members of the Court, upheld a
North Carolina redistricting plan against a racial gerrymandering claim. Justice
O'Connor agreed with the four liberal Justices that the composition of the
challenged legislative districts was best explained by partisan motivations, not
racial ones.95 What views the two new members of the Court will have on these
claims remains to be seen,96 but racial gerrymandering seems to be an issue that has
split the Court along liberal and conservative lines. The Court is likely to continue
to split to the extent the Court confronts racial gerrymandering again.
The other major voting rights issue likely to reach the Supreme Court in the
next few years is the constitutionality of the renewed preclearance provisions of the
Voting Rights Act. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,97 the Supreme Court upheld
the preclearance provisions of the original 1965 Voting Rights Act as a permissible
exercise of congressional power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition
of discrimination in voting on the basis of race.98 Calling the requirement that a
covered jurisdiction obtain federal approval before changing its own laws
"uncommon," the Court declared that "exceptional conditions can justify legislative
measures not otherwise appropriate. Congress knew that some of the [covered
states] ... had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of
various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face
of adverse federal court decrees."
As I explain in great detail elsewhere,'00 despite Katzenbach, the
constitutionality of a renewed preclearance provision has been called into question
by the Rehnquist Court's New Federalism jurisprudence, which has reined in
congressional power vis-a-vis the states. Beginning with City of Boerne v.
Flores,'O' the Court has held that when Congress regulates the states under its
94. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
95. Id. at 255.
96. There is good reason to believe that these claims have reached an end point. Most of the
oddly shaped majority-minority districts that caught the Supreme Court's attention in these cases appear
to have been drawn as a result of pressure from the Department of Justice on jurisdictions covered by
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Various Supreme Court cases interpreting Section 5 removed the
legal basis for the DOJ to force covered jurisdictions to draw many additional majority-minority
districts, and apparently, for this reason we have seen a decline in the number of racial gerrymandering
claims. See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: A Reply to Three Commentators,
31 J. LEGIS. 1, 12 (2004).
97. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
98. Id. at 308.
99. Id. at 334-35 (citations omitted).
100. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J., 77 (2005).
101. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, °2 it must provide evidence of
intentional state discrimination to justify a remedy-a remedy which must be
"congruent" and "proportional" to the state's violations.'°3
From this perspective, the problem for Congress in a renewed Voting Rights
Act is finding enough evidence of intentional state discrimination to justify
preclearance both today, and potentially for another twenty-five years. The Catch-
22 is that since the Voting Rights Act has been so successful, it is hard to find
sufficient evidence of such discrimination to satisfy the Court that preclearance
remains a congruent and proportional remedy.
In the two most recent Supreme Court cases in this area, the Court seemed to
have pulled back a bit from its New Federalism jurisprudence, giving more leeway
to Congress to remedy what it perceives to be state discrimination.'14 Those cases,
however, depended upon the votes of Justice O'Connor in Tennessee v. Lane and
Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs. Chief Justice Roberts has already expressed concern about the
federalism costs of Section 2,'05 which could apply equally to a renewed Section 5.
Again, the deciding vote on this very important question may remain with Justice
Alito. If Justice Alito accepts the stronger version of the New Federalism, there
is a significant chance the Court could strike down the renewed preclearance
provisions of the Voting Rights Act as exceeding congressional power.
IV. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
It seems quite likely that the Supreme Court will need to clarify the issue of
partisan gerrymandering within the next decade-perhaps even this Term-if only
because the Supreme Court's current resolution of the issue is unstable. Speaking
generally, the results of the Court's 2004 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer° 6 left the
partisan gerrymandering issue undecided. Four Justices-including Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor-took the position that partisan gerrymandering
should be nonjusticiable. °7 Four Justices took the position that a state violates the
Equal Protection Clause when it takes partisanship into account too much in
redistricting, though they differed in the particulars of how to separate permissible
use of voters' party registration information from impermissible partisan
gerrymandering.' Justice Kennedy, the deciding vote in the case, agreed that such
102. The Court has read the enforcement powers of Congress under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments as coextensive. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8
(2001).
103. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-34.
104. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509 (2004).
105. See supra text accompanying note 89.
106. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
107. Id. at 281.
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claims should be justiciable, but he believed none of the Justices who would police
partisan gerrymandering had come up with a judicially manageable test to separate
out unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders. 9
The messiness of Vieth became apparent almost immediately after the decision.
In Cox v. Larios,"° the Court seemed to contradict the logic, if not the holding, of
Vieth by summarily affirming a lower court decision striking down a Georgia
districting plan."' Plaintiffs attacked the plan on grounds that it violated the one-
person, one-vote rule."12 Many had believed that such attacks on state legislative
redistricting plans were doomed to failure so long as the deviation from population
equality in the districts was less than ten percent. Yet the lower court in Larios
struck down a plan with a deviation below ten percent, partially on grounds that the
only explanation for the deviations was a desire to redistrict for partisan
advantage.1 1 3 It remains unclear how to square Cox with Vieth." 4
In addition, the Court's mixed signals continued elsewhere. Rather than simply
summarily affirm a three-judge court's pre-Vieth ruling" 5 that the Texas
congressional redistricting did not violate the Equal Protection Clause," 6 the
Supreme Court sent the case back for reconsideration in light of Vieth."7 This was
an odd decision because the gerrymander in Texas was in some ways less partisan
than the one in Pennsylvania,"' and there was no reason to believe that the
109. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (summary affirmance).
111. Id. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 947-49.
114. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 16, at 564-77. Back in 1985, Justice Alito expressed
some disagreement with the one-person, one-vote standards of the Warren Court, and it appears today
that he does not believe in a requirement of strict mathematical equality in districting. See Richard L.
Hasen, One Person, One Filibuster?, FINDLAW, Nov. 30, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com-
commentary/20051130_hasen.html (discussing uncertainty about Justice Alito's views on one-person,
one-vote rules). In written answers to the Senate Judiciary Committee considering his nomination to
the Supreme Court, Justice Alito wrote:
As far as I can recall, I have always agreed with the principle of one-person, one-
vote. In any event, that is certainly my view today. I explained during the hearings
that my concern about reapportionment during my college days related to the
application of this principle in later cases to require that all districts be almost
exactly equal in population even if this requires disregarding other legitimate
factors.
Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Responses of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to the Written Questions of Senator
Charles E. Schumer 11 (Jan. 20, 2006), available at http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/
AlitoAnswers012006.pdf.
115. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (three-judge court).
116. Id. at 457.
117. Henderson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004) (vacating judgment and remanding for further
consideration in light of Vieth).
118. Or at least so the three-judge court concluded on remand. See Henderson v. Perry, 399 F.
Supp. 2d 756, 770 (E.D. Tex. 2005) ("In short, under the plan passed by the Pennsylvania General
Assembly and upheld by the Court in Vieth, the party that garnered, on average, less than half the vote
in statewide races was able to capture nearly two-thirds of Pennsylvania's congressional seats. In
contrast, the plan passed by the Texas legislature resulted in the election of twenty-one Republicans and
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plaintiffs in the Texas case would do any better than the Vieth plaintiffs in
developing a judicially manageable partisan gerrymandering standard that would
satisfy Justice Kennedy.
The Texas case is back before the Supreme Court after the three-judge court
reached the same conclusion it had reached before in Vieth. While this confusion
should lead the Supreme Court to tackle the issue again in the near future, it is not
clear how changes in Court personnel will affect the outcome of the case. If Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito vote as their predecessors did and no other Justices
change their positions, we would be left with the same 4-1-4 split on this question.
But if either Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito side with the four Vieth
dissenters, there would be a majority willing to impose a standard that would have
the courts policing at least some partisan gerrymanders. Another possibility, of
course, is that Justice Kennedy commits himself more fully to one side of this
controversy or the other, forming a five-Justice majority.
How the new Justices are likely to vote on this issue is difficult to determine.
In Vieth, the Court split with the four more liberal members of the Court supporting
the policing of partisan gerrymandering and four of the five more conservative
members supporting nonjusticiability. I suppose that a continued 4-1-4 split is the
most likely outcome. However, partisan gerrymandering does not necessarily
create a liberal-conservative split. Consider, for example, former professor and
current Tenth Circuit Judge McConnell. Judge McConnell is considered to be
conservative on many issues, such as abortion. 9 Yet, he has shown a willingness
to consider whether courts should police partisan gerrymandering claims. 20
V. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS
The final major issue the Supreme Court is likely to face results from the direct
and indirect fallout from the 2000 Florida election controversy, culminating in the
Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore.'2 ' In that case, the Supreme Court ended the
controversy over whether George W. Bush or Al Gore would be declared the
winner of Florida's twenty-five electoral votes-and therefore the winner of the
2000 presidential election-when it held that the selective manual recounts the
Florida Supreme Court ordered violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1
22
eleven Democrats to the House of Representatives in 2004, when the Republican Party carried 58% of
the vote in statewide races and the Democratic Party carried 41% of the vote.").
119. See David Von Drehle, O'Connor Used Vote to Entrench Right to Abortion, WASH. POST,
July 2, 2005, at A10 ("Before becoming a judge in 2002, McConnell was one of America's leading
antiabortion thinkers and once described the original abortion fights decision, Roe v. Wade, as an
'embarrassment."').
120. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 114-16 (2000).
121. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
122. Id. at 103.
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After the opinion issued, scholars debated whether the opinion had precedential
value and, if so, whether it properly should be read as a case about giving voters
roughly equal treatment in how their votes are cast and counted, or about making
sure that partisan election officials do not have too much discretion in the rules they
use for administering elections. 23 The Supreme Court has failed to cite the case
since it has been decided, even when an issue on all fours with Chief Justice
Rehnquist' s concurrence came before the Court.1
4
In the meantime, some lower courts are using Bush v. Gore as an equal
protection precedent2 5 with an emerging judicial division on its scope and meaning
in the context of suits against jurisdictions that have failed to update their voting
equipment from the outdated and unreliable "punch card" voting machines that
gained notoriety from their use in some of the Florida counties in the Bush v. Gore
case.
More importantly, the case has apparently had the indirect effect of opening up
the lower courts to more election law cases. From 1996 to 1999, an average of
ninety such cases came before lower courts per year, and from 2000 to 2004, the
number rose to an average of 361 cases per year.126 Most of these cases did not
raise equal protection claims, but they did show that litigation over the nuts and
bolts of elections has increased in the wake of the Florida 2000 controversy.
The Supreme Court must eventually resolve the scope of its ruling in Bush v.
Gore. As Chief Justice Roberts noted at his confirmation hearings:
While it is true that the precise facts presented in Bush v. Gore are
not likely to come before the Court again, it is not at all
improbable that other election disputes will. While the Court in
Bush v. Gore stated that its "consideration is limited to the present
circumstances," I believe that statement was not meant to deprive
the decision of all precedential weight but, rather, to make clear
that the precise facts of the case were unique. And while it is
undoubtedly true that "the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities," the equal
protection principles at issue in Bush v. Gore may be implicated
in future cases.'27
123. See Hasen, supra note 19, at 378-80.
124. See Hasen, supra note 20, at 957 n.76.
125. Compare Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899 (N.D. 111. 2002) (holding that
Illinois' selective use of punch-card voting machines is a potential equal protection violation), with
Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791, 808-09 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that Ohio's selective use
of punch-card machines is not an equal protection violation).
126. Hasen, supra note 20, at 958.
127. Judge John. G. Roberts, Jr., Responses of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr. to the Written Questions
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In what sorts of future cases will this issue arise? Consider, for example, the
current controversy over Georgia's voter identification law. 2 ' Georgia recently
passed a law requiring that voters produce voter identification before being able to
vote at the polls, though it did not require the production of a voter identification
to file an absentee ballot. '29 Voters can use only certain forms of identification such
as a state driver's license, and the state has provided means for poor voters to obtain
identification from the state without charge. 130 However, to obtain that state
identification, voters need to produce documents, such as a birth certificate, that
often cost money to obtain. 3'
Over the objections of civil rights organizations, the Department of Justice
precleared the Georgia voter identification law under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.132 Plaintiffs then filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the law
violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.133 The
district court issued a preliminary injunction against the law, ruling that plaintiffs
were likely to be able to prove an Equal Protection violation on grounds the law is
a de facto "poll tax." '134 The Eleventh Circuit is currently considering an appeal of
the preliminary injunction.
1 35
The Georgia case is just one of the many kinds of nuts-and-bolts election law
cases that can make their way to the Supreme Court in the next decade. In the 2004
election, we saw constitutional challenges over how to count provisional ballots,
the propriety of election "challengers" challenging particular voters' qualifications
to vote, and questions over the means for the counting and recounting of votes in
the Washington gubernatorial race. 136
While we do not know how the Supreme Court will resolve these kinds of
claims if and when they are considered, a Supreme Court made up of a conservative
majority is unlikely to read the Equal Protection Clause expansively so as to open
up the courts to many equal protection challenges to the nuts and bolts of elections.
Indeed, it was this instinct that a conservative Court would not read the Equal
Protection Clause expansively which made the holding of Bush v. Gore so
surprising, and drew criticism of the majority-that it engaged in result-oriented
128. The federal district court opinion granting a preliminary injunction against the Georgia voter
identification law under both the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause contains a history
of the law and the surrounding litigation. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326
(N.D. Ga. 2005).
129. Id. at 1331, 1361-62, 21-22.
130. Id. at 1336, 1338-40.
131. Id. at 1340.
132. Id. at 1336-37.
133. Id. at 1354.
134. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
135. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Cox, No. 05-15784-G (11 th Cir. Oct. 27, 2005), available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigatidon/documents/I1thCircuitDenial.pdf. The Eleventh
Circuit refused to grant Georgia's motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal.
136. More information about this litigation appears in Hasen, supra note 20, at 968-69.
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judging to benefit a Republican candidate.'37 Still, outside the context of the highly
charged presidential election of 2000, I do not expect the Roberts Court to read the
Equal Protection Clause expansively in this area.
VI. CONCLUSION
Making predictions is always dangerous, and the conclusions I reach should be
taken in the tentative spirit in which they are made. My best guess is that a decade
from now, we may well face a set of election law rules that differ a great deal from
today's rules. It may be that in 2016, individuals, corporations, and unions will be
free to give as much money as they want to any candidate or group, subject to the
filing of disclosure reports. The federal government's ability to protect the voting
rights of minority groups that historically have been the victims of state
discrimination may be curtailed by the inability of Congress to require any
jurisdictions to submit their voting changes for preclearance and by an emasculated
reading of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The ability of states to manipulate
election rules for partisan gain may present the greatest danger as the Court exits
from that corner of the political thicket. For those who look to courts for the
promotion of political equality, the signs are not encouraging.
137. See Hasen, supra note 19, at 390 ("It is not so much that these Justices do not 'like' equal
protection as that we would not have expected them to use the Equal Protection Clause to create new
federal oversight of the minutiae of state and local elections. Besides the federalism costs which make
the majority's holding surprising, no Rehnquist Court opinion had ever relied upon [Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964)] or [Harper Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)] to expand oversight
of the electoral process or to expand the franchise." (footnotes omitted)).
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